ABDUS-SALAAM, J.
In a false arrest action under federal and state law, evidence that the defendant police officers arrested the plaintiff without probable cause, after inventing a patently false confession, may establish the officers' liability for detaining the plaintiff without any lawful privilege. Evidence that the officers forwarded the false confession to prosecutors can satisfy the commencement element of a malicious prosecution cause of action,
On the night of September 24, 2002, Einstein Romeo Acuna's son found Acuna's dead body in front of the doorway to the apartment that they shared in Queens. Acuna's son called the police and reported the death. As later recounted by the individual defendants in their depositions in the instant civil actions, defendants Detective Michael McEntee and Detective Daniel Corey responded to the scene. There, the detectives saw Acuna's naked corpse in a pool of blood in the hallway in front of Acuna's apartment. Evidently, Acuna had been stabbed repeatedly.
On a return trip to the apartment on or shortly after the date of the crime, Detective McEntee discovered a woman's crucifix necklace on the nightstand in Acuna's bedroom. When interviewed by the police, however, Acuna's relatives essentially stated that, to their knowledge, Acuna did not have a girlfriend. Additionally, Acuna's family and neighbors did not identify anyone who had a motive to murder Acuna.
According to the police witnesses' testimony at a suppression hearing in the criminal prosecution that led to the instant lawsuit, developments following the police's initial investigation led them to contact plaintiff Maria De Lourdes Torres. Specifically, Detectives Santiago and McEntee eventually learned that Acuna's telephone records showed that, on the day of the murder, someone had called Acuna's cellular telephone from a telephone located at plaintiff's residence. The records further reflected that Acuna had repeatedly received calls from that telephone on various occasions.
On October 11, 2002, Detective McEntee went to the apartment. There, McEntee met the couple who owned the apartment, and in response to his inquiries, they said that they did not know Acuna and had not called him. The couple further explained that, besides themselves, only plaintiff, who rented a room from them, could have accessed the telephone in the apartment. Soon thereafter, McEntee spoke to plaintiff in the presence of the apartment owners. Displaying a photograph of Acuna, McEntee asked plaintiff whether she knew the man in the photograph, and she claimed that she did not know him.
At the precinct, Santiago and Hendricks asked plaintiff again whether she knew Acuna and had telephoned him on the day of the murder. About 15 minutes into this conversation, Santiago showed Acuna's telephone records to plaintiff, at which point she acknowledged that she knew Acuna. Plaintiff stated that she had previously lied about calling Acuna on the day of the crime because she had used the telephone in her apartment to make the calls, which the owners had forbidden her to do, and she did not want to admit her unauthorized use of the telephone in their presence. After receiving this explanation, Santiago permitted plaintiff to leave.
In early November 2002, the police contacted plaintiff and asked her whether she would submit to a polygraph examination, and she replied that she would. At about 7:00 a.m. on November 8, 2002, Detective Santiago and defendant Detective Denitor Guerra picked up plaintiff at her home and transported her to the precinct, where they arrived at about 7:30 a.m. Plaintiff waited in a room with the detectives for almost two hours, during which time the detectives did not question her. Detectives Santiago, Guerra and Hendricks then took plaintiff to the District Attorney's Office. There, at about 9:30 a.m., plaintiff signed a consent form and agreed to take the polygraph test, and the detectives sat with her while they waited for a few hours for the polygraph device to be available and ready for use. At about 12:30 p.m., defendant Lieutenant Velardi, the Deputy Chief Investigator at the District Attorney's Office, administered the polygraph examination, and Santiago and Velardi asked plaintiff questions relating to Acuna's murder, repeating each question multiple times and in Spanish. The examination lasted about 40 minutes.
Next, the detectives requested permission to search plaintiff's room, and plaintiff signed a consent form authorizing the search. Later that morning, Detective Corey searched the room. Corey recovered the clothes that, according to plaintiff's statement, she had worn during the murder. Corey also found a knife in the room. The police arrested Torres for Acuna's murder.
The District Attorney's Office convened a grand jury in this case, and in January 2003, the grand jury returned an indictment charging plaintiff with two counts of murder in the second degree (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1], [2]) and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 265.01 [2]). Subsequently, plaintiff filed an omnibus motion for, among other things, dismissal of the indictment and suppression of her statement to the police and of the evidence recovered from her room.
In February 2003, while plaintiff's omnibus motion was pending, OCME completed preliminary forensic testing on the blood found in Acuna's apartment. The test results indicated that the blood belonged to Acuna and two unknown males. At that time, OCME had not compared plaintiff's DNA to the DNA present in the blood in Acuna's apartment. The record does not reveal whether the investigating detectives learned of the preliminary DNA test results during the criminal proceedings against plaintiff.
At a Huntley/Mapp hearing following an in camera inspection of the grand jury minutes, in summer 2003, prosecutors
Meanwhile, in January 2004, OCME completed its comparison of plaintiff's DNA to the DNA in the blood samples taken from Acuna's apartment, and the results showed that plaintiff's DNA was not present in the blood samples. The record does not indicate whether the detectives learned about these test results during the criminal proceedings against plaintiff.
After Supreme Court denied plaintiff's suppression motion, plaintiff moved to reopen the suppression hearing and call Detectives Guerra and Hendricks to testify at the reopened hearing. Supreme Court granted plaintiff's application to reopen the suppression hearing, and at the reopened hearing, Detectives Guerra and Hendricks testified to their roles in the investigation as recounted above. Crediting their testimony, Supreme Court again denied plaintiff's suppression motion.
In January 2007, the District Attorney's Office moved to dismiss the charges against plaintiff, and the court granted the motion.
In September 2007, plaintiff commenced the first of the instant civil rights actions by filing a complaint in Supreme Court against the City of New York and several police officers involved in the investigation of Acuna's murder, including Lieutenant Velardi and Detectives Santiago, Guerra, Hendricks, Corey and McEntee. In the complaint, plaintiff asserted a cause of action against the City and the individual defendants for violation of 42 USC § 1983, a cause of action against the City for negligent supervision and a cause of action against the individual defendants for wanton, wilful and reckless conduct. Plaintiff maintained, inter alia, that the City had negligently failed to supervise the officers who wrongfully suspected her of killing Acuna and had negligently furthered her wrongful arrest and prosecution. Only the City answered in the first action. Plaintiff did not serve any of the other defendants and unsuccessfully sought an extension of time in which to do so.
Thereafter, plaintiff commenced the second lawsuit by filing a complaint against the New York City Police Department
Detectives McEntee, Santiago, Corey and Hendricks were deposed in these actions.
At their depositions, the detectives gave an account of the disputed events that was mostly consistent with the prosecution witnesses' testimony at the suppression hearing. However, while the detectives' suppression hearing testimony covered primarily their interactions with plaintiff, their deposition testimony recounted their investigation at the crime scene and the other developments in the investigation summarized above. And, the detectives provided new details about their discussions with plaintiff on November 8 and November 9, 2002.
According to their deposition testimony, just prior to the polygraph examination on November 8, 2002, Detective McEntee showed plaintiff a crime scene photograph of Acuna and asked her to confirm that she knew Acuna. Upon seeing the picture, plaintiff cried out, but she immediately returned to a state of calm in a manner that struck McEntee as "[c]old blooded." Following the polygraph examination, Lieutenant Velardi informed Santiago that the results were "[i]nconsistent,
After the polygraph examination and a lunch break, at about 11:30 p.m., the detectives interrogated plaintiff as described at the suppression hearing. At some point during the interrogation, the interviewing detectives told Detective Corey that defendant was crying and claiming that she had accidentally killed Acuna. At around that time, plaintiff orally confessed to her interrogators that she had killed Acuna in self-defense, and Santiago wrote versions of that statement in English and Spanish. According to her paperwork, Santiago finished writing the statement at about 4:45 a.m., not at 1:45 a.m. as she had suggested in her hearing testimony.
The English-language version of the statement declared that plaintiff had met Acuna two years before the murder. According to the statement, they started a friendship that later became a sexual relationship. One day during the week prior to the date of the murder, plaintiff was having sex with Acuna, and he demanded that she remove her crucifix necklace while they were engaging in this intimate activity. She complied and left the necklace in his bedroom. Later that week, plaintiff called Acuna to ask him to return the necklace, and although they made various plans for its return later that week, those plans fell through.
Regarding the day of the murder, plaintiff's written statement said:
Following this explanation of the origin of the confrontation between plaintiff and Acuna, the statement continued:
After making this statement, plaintiff consented to a search of her room. The detectives arrested plaintiff.
"Years later," the District Attorney's Office told Corey that the DNA of one male other than Acuna had been found in the blood samples recovered from the scene of the crime. Otherwise, Corey never saw any lab reports or DNA test results. At their depositions, Detectives McEntee and Corey were questioned about whether NYPD supervisors encouraged swift arrests in homicide cases. McEntee testified that the NYPD considered the number of cases closed by arrest as one factor among many in a detective's performance evaluation. Corey testified that his superiors did not pressure him in any way to resolve the investigation of Acuna's murder.
At her deposition, plaintiff described her own background, explaining that she was an undocumented Mexican immigrant who sold flowers on Roosevelt Avenue in Queens, that she spoke some English but was far more fluent in Spanish and that she had only an elementary school education. About a year before Acuna's death, plaintiff met him while she was selling flowers, and she started a friendship with him which, after a couple of weeks, became a sexual relationship.
According to plaintiff, when the detectives interviewed her on October 11, 2002, she told Detective McEntee that she did not know Acuna. Plaintiff hid her relationship with Acuna because she was afraid to reveal that, in the course of that relationship, she had called him from her apartment in violation of her landlords' directive not to use the telephone there. Additionally, plaintiff had difficulty recognizing Acuna in the photograph displayed by McEntee because Acuna did not have a beard in that photograph, as he did for the entire period in which they had known each other.
On October 25, 2002, plaintiff initially concealed from Detectives Santiago and Hendricks her familiarity with Acuna and
On November 8, 2002, plaintiff agreed to take a polygraph examination, and Detectives Santiago, Guerra and Hendricks drove her to the precinct. There, the detectives interrogated her for three to five hours, again displaying the bloody clothes and the photographs. Santiago told her that she "had to" claim that she had killed Acuna in self-defense. Santiago directed plaintiff to claim that Acuna had grabbed her by the hair and thrown her against the wall. Santiago also accused plaintiff of killing Acuna out of jealousy, saying that "if [she] had done it to accept it" so that Santiago would help her. Santiago reiterated that Santiago would tell plaintiff what to say so that Santiago could help her, but plaintiff continued to deny that she had killed Acuna. The detectives left plaintiff alone in the room, and she started to cry.
Later that day, Santiago returned to the interview room and started writing something on a piece of paper. Santiago told plaintiff to write that she had committed the crime, but plaintiff refused and insisted on her innocence. Santiago next told plaintiff to "say that it was in self-defense." Santiago presented plaintiff with a written statement to this effect, but plaintiff refused to sign it. Santiago asserted that signing the statement was "for [plaintiff's] good" and that Santiago "would
At that point, another detective entered the room. This detective offered plaintiff food and soothingly informed her that if she signed the statement, that would help her. The detective pointed out that the statement would indicate that she had acted "in self-defense and that is what many women did." The detectives repeated that plaintiff could leave if she signed the statement, and she finally signed it in the early hours of November 9 because Detective Santiago "made [her] sign that paper." At some point, Santiago sought to videotape her interview with plaintiff, but plaintiff refused to be taped.
After plaintiff signed the confession drafted by Detective Santiago, the detectives placed her in a holding cell. Santiago offered plaintiff her business card and said that plaintiff should call her if plaintiff wanted the advice of a mother. Thereafter, the police took plaintiff to the jail at Rikers Island, where she remained for the duration of the criminal proceedings against her.
After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaints in both actions. In support of the motion, defendants asserted, inter alia, that the detectives' deposition testimony and other evidence established that they had lawfully arrested plaintiff based on her suspicious conduct, including her voluntary confession that she had murdered Acuna. Defendants also argued that they had demonstrated their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the probable cause and malice elements of plaintiff's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. And, defendants maintained that plaintiff had neither pleaded nor proved that the City had a custom or practice of committing constitutional violations that could render it liable under 42 USC § 1983. Additionally, defendants argued that plaintiff had abandoned her claims against the individual defendants on whose behalf the City had not interposed an answer because she had failed to seek entry of a default judgment against them within one year.
Plaintiff opposed defendants' motion, asserting that the detectives' testimony did not conclusively establish that they had probable cause to arrest her and that her testimony created
In a short form order filed in the first action on August 10, 2012, Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's claims against all of the individual defendants as abandoned, and it dismissed the complaint against the City on the merits (2012 NY Slip Op 32286[U] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2012]). Plaintiff appealed the August 10 order to the Appellate Division. Evidently, judgment was never entered in the first action.
In a short form order filed in the second action on August 9, 2012, Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's claims against Lieutenant Velardi and Detective Corey as abandoned, and it dismissed her claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, violations of 42 USC § 1981 and violations of 42 USC § 1983 on the merits (36 Misc.3d 1238[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51739[U] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2012]). On November 30, 2012, Supreme Court, relying on the August 9 order, entered judgment dismissing the complaint against defendants in the second action. Plaintiff appealed from both the August 9 order and the November 30 judgment. The Appellate Division consolidated plaintiff's appeals in both actions (2013 NY Slip Op 60957[U] [2d Dept 2013]).
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the August 10 order and the November 30 judgment dismissing the complaints in both actions, and it dismissed the appeal from the August 9 order in the second action on the ground that the issues raised
Under the common law, a plaintiff may bring suit for false arrest and imprisonment against one who has unlawfully robbed the plaintiff of his or her "freedom from restraint of movement" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929 [1975]; see Dan B. Dobbs et al., Torts § 41 [2d ed 2011]). To prevail on such a cause of action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, that the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and that the confinement was not privileged (see Donald v State of New York, 17 N.Y.3d 389, 394-395 [2011]; Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 N.Y.2d 78, 85 [2001]; Parvi v City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 556 [1977]). For purposes of the privilege element of a false arrest and imprisonment claim, an act of confinement is privileged if it stems from a lawful arrest supported by probable cause (see Gisondi v Town of Harrison, 72 N.Y.2d 280, 283 [1988]; Broughton, 37 NY2d at 458; see also Fortunato v City of New York, 63 A.D.3d 880, 880 [2d Dept 2009]). "Probable cause consists of such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances to believe plaintiff guilty" (Colon v City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82 [1983]). "Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed" by the suspected individual, and probable cause must be judged under the totality of the circumstances (People v Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423 [1985]).
We have "never elaborated on how a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case demonstrates that the defendant commenced or continued the underlying criminal proceeding" (Grucci v Grucci, 20 N.Y.3d 893, 896 n [2012]). But, by suggesting that a defendant other than a public prosecutor may be liable for supplying false information to the prosecutor in substantial furtherance of a criminal action against the plaintiff, we have implicitly recognized that such conduct may, depending on the circumstances, constitute the commencement or continuation of the prosecution (see Colon, 60 NY2d at 82 [noting that proof establishing "that the police witnesses" have falsified evidence may create liability for malicious prosecution]; see also Hopkinson v Lehigh Val. R.R. Co., 249 N.Y. 296, 300-301 [1928] [noting that the falsification of evidence and presentation of that evidence to the prosecutor can constitute commencement of a prosecution]). Relevant Appellate Division decisions are to the same effect (see Ramos v City of New York, 285 A.D.2d 284, 298-299 [1st Dept 2001]; cf. DeFilippo v County of Nassau, 183 A.D.2d 695, 696 [2d Dept 1992]). Similarly, in other jurisdictions, the rule is that the defendant commences the prosecution of the plaintiff if the defendant demands in bad faith that
Just as in the false arrest context, the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must also establish at trial the absence of probable cause to believe that he or she committed the charged crimes, but this element operates differently in the malicious prosecution context because "[o]nce a suspect has been indicted, ... the law holds that the Grand Jury action creates a presumption of probable cause" (Colon, 60 NY2d at 82; see Grucci, 20 NY3d at 898; Lee v City of Mount Vernon, 49 N.Y.2d 1041, 1043 [1980]). Generally, the plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption of probable cause with evidence merely indicating that the authorities acquired information that, depending on the inferences one might choose to draw, might have fallen somewhat shy of establishing probable cause (see Colon, 60 NY2d at 83). And, even if the plaintiff shows a sufficiently serious lack of cause for the prosecution and rebuts the presumption at trial, he or she still must prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendant acted with malice, i.e., that the defendant "must have commenced the prior criminal proceeding due to a wrong or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served" (Nardelli v Stamberg, 44 N.Y.2d 500, 503 [1978]).
Although burdensome, these barriers to a malicious prosecution plaintiff's recovery are not insurmountable, and in some instances, the plaintiff can simultaneously rebut the presumption of probable cause and satisfy the malice element by demonstrating that the evidence of guilt relied upon by the defendant was so scant that the prosecution was entirely baseless and maliciously instituted. In that sense, "[w]hile lack of probable cause to institute a criminal proceeding and proof of actual malice are independent and indispensable elements of a malicious prosecution action, the absence of probable cause does bear on the malice issue," and "probable cause to initiate a criminal proceeding may be so totally lacking as to reasonably
The foregoing elements and considerations also impact a plaintiff's parallel claims under 42 USC § 1983, which authorizes the plaintiff to sue government agents for unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution in violation of the laws and Constitution of the United States (see 42 USC § 1983; Albright v Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270-275 [1994] [op of Rehnquist, Ch. J.]; Lennon v Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 423-425 [2d Cir 1995]; cf. Rehberg v Paulk, 566 US ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1507-1508 [2012]). Indeed, the elements of those causes of action under the federal statute are substantially the same as the elements of the comparable state common-law claims, and they are evaluated in much the same way (see Simpson v City of New York, 793 F.3d 259, 265 [2d Cir 2015]; Weyant v Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 [2d Cir 1996]; Manganiello v City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160-161 [2d Cir 2010]; see also Paulos v City of New York, 122 A.D.3d 815, 817 [2d Dept 2014]). However, as will be discussed in detail hereinafter, the government itself cannot be liable for false arrest or malicious prosecution under 42 USC § 1983 unless an official government policy, custom or widespread practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights (Monell, 436 US at 694, 701; Canton v Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 [1989]).
Considering the aforementioned law in the context of a summary judgment motion, the defendant moving for summary judgment must establish a defense to the plaintiff's malicious prosecution and false arrest claims as a matter of law by submitting sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues
The law outlined above reveals that the lower courts here improperly granted summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's common-law false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and it forecloses judgment as a matter of law in favor of the individual defendants on plaintiff's claims under 42 USC § 1983.
The proof of Lieutenant Velardi's assessment of plaintiff's performance during the polygraph examination, as formed at the time of plaintiff's interrogation and conveyed to Detective Santiago, did not eliminate any possible factual dispute regarding whether the test results raised the detectives' suspicion to the level of probable cause. As far as the record shows, Velardi merely told Detective Santiago that plaintiff had lied about
Crediting plaintiff's testimony for purposes of summary judgment, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the confession increased the detectives' suspicion to the level of probable cause, for by her account, they invented a false confession and forced her to sign it. In that regard, plaintiff testified that, on November 8 and into November 9, Detectives Guerra and Santiago wore down her resistance to their demands that she confess to the murder over an extended period of time. In fact, if a jury were to credit all of plaintiff's testimony and part of the detectives' testimony, the jurors could find that the detectives questioned her for around 21 hours and that, during at least 11 of those hours, plaintiff did not feel free to leave. Throughout that period, Santiago told plaintiff that she "had to" confess to killing Acuna, positing alternative theories of plaintiff's motive by suggesting that she had killed him in self-defense or out of jealousy. From the early stages of the interview, Santiago insinuated details of the crime that ended up in the confession, including the written confession's allegation that plaintiff had stabbed Acuna after he slammed her head into a wall. As Santiago continued to insist that plaintiff admit her guilt throughout the interview at the police precinct, Santiago also declared that Santiago would tell plaintiff what she should say so that Santiago could help her. Implicitly threatening to make an imminent "definite decision" to arrest her, Santiago made plaintiff fear that she would soon be imprisoned if she did not confess.
In the later stages of the interrogation, Santiago alone wrote out the confession, without plaintiff's input, and then urged
Beyond the tactics described by plaintiff, the detectives' own familiarity with the evidence in the case should have given them pause about the reliability of the statement they purportedly drafted for plaintiff to sign. The confession claimed that plaintiff had sex with Acuna using a condom, that she had stabbed Acuna in the kitchen and that she had run out of the apartment to the elevator. But the detectives never found a condom or wrapper in the apartment, there was not much blood in the kitchen and the blood trail from the apartment suggested that the killer had fled down the stairs rather than into the elevator. Accordingly, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the inconsistencies between the crime scene evidence and the confession, as well as plaintiff's account of the detectives' invention of the confession, revealed that the detectives knew that the confession was false and that therefore it could not have reasonably contributed to their
Turning to plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims, the evidence that the detectives falsified plaintiff's confession and provided the confession to the District Attorney's Office for use in the prosecution of plaintiff created a triable issue of fact on the commencement element of malicious prosecution. Because it is undisputed that the detectives who participated in the creation of the confession also had it sent to the District Attorney's Office, those detectives knew or should have known that their submission of the plaintiff's unequivocal admission to killing Acuna would cause prosecutors to bring a criminal proceeding against plaintiff, and consequently, the detectives' role in commencing the prosecution, coupled with plaintiff's testimony about the falsity of the confession, yielded a triable issue of fact on the commencement element of her malicious prosecution claim.
Additionally, the proof recounted above, from which the falsification of evidence and the absence of probable cause could be inferred, produced a triable issue of fact regarding whether probable cause supported plaintiff's prosecution. Because evidence that a police officer lacked probable cause to believe that the plaintiff committed a crime and provided a falsified confession to prosecutors can rebut the presumption of probable cause arising from an indictment (see Colon, 60 NY2d at 82-83), the evidence here that the detectives did not have probable cause to believe that plaintiff had killed Acuna, made a
While plaintiff maintains triable claims against the individual defendants under federal law, the same is not true of her federal civil rights claims against the City and the NYPD. As previously noted, plaintiff can proceed to trial against the governmental defendants on her claims under 42 USC § 1983 only if the record discloses a triable issue of fact as to whether an official policy or custom of the City government itself caused the detectives to violate her constitutional rights. Under Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs. (436 U.S. 658 [1978]) and its progeny, "[o]fficial municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law" (Connick v Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 [2011]; see Simpson v New York City Tr. Auth., 112 A.D.2d 89, 91 [1st Dept 1985], affd 66 N.Y.2d 1010 [1985]). Stated differently, the existence of such a policy may be shown by proof that the municipality had a custom or practice that was both widespread and reflected a deliberate indifference to its citizens' constitutional rights (see id. at 60-62; Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-407 [1997]; Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 819-823 [1985]; Jones v Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 [2d Cir 2012]). Furthermore, to render the City liable under section 1983, the City's custom or practice had to be the "moving force" behind plaintiff's constitutional injury (Brown, 520 US at 404; see Surprenant v Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 19 n 6 [1st Cir 2005]).
Here, the evidence does not support an inference that the City and the NYPD had a widespread custom of arresting people in violation of their constitutional rights, nor is there any proof that such a policy caused the allegedly wrongful arrest
Notably, plaintiff's expert offered no factual support, beyond his recitation of plaintiff's account of her arrest, for his belief that the NYPD had a policy of pressuring police officers to quickly arrest homicide suspects, nor could his familiarity with NYPD policy during the 1980s have supplied an adequate basis for his unsubstantiated opinion about any policy in effect at the time of plaintiff's arrest decades later. In addition, although Detective McEntee testified that NYPD supervisors generally took a detective's case closure rate into account in analyzing his or her performance, the NYPD's practice of incentivizing arrests via a multifactor evaluation does not in itself amount to a practice of promoting arrests without probable cause. Moreover, even if plaintiff had established the existence of a municipal practice of promoting arrests without probable cause in homicide cases, neither Williams nor McEntee alleged facts establishing that any particular policy in effect at the time of plaintiff's arrest was the cause of the detectives' decision to arrest her. Therefore, on this record, there is no triable issue of fact as to whether an official City policy caused the police to unlawfully arrest plaintiff, and the lower courts properly granted summary judgment to the City and the NYPD on plaintiff's claims under 42 USC § 1983.
On a final note, while we agree with plaintiff that the courts below improperly granted summary judgment to the individual defendants on her claims, we reject her argument that the detectives' suppression hearing testimony that her confession was voluntary, as opposed to their transmission of the sham confession to the prosecutors in the first instance, may on its
However, here, while the testimony may not serve as a separate act of commencement or continuation, it is relevant evidence that the officers had a malicious state of mind in creating and transmitting the falsified confession. The test is "whether the plaintiff can make out the elements of his [or her] § 1983 claim without resorting to the ... testimony. If the claim exists independently of the ... testimony, it is not `based on' that testimony ... [c]onversely, if the claim requires the ... testimony, the defendant enjoys absolute immunity" (Coggins v Buonora, 776 F.3d 108, 113 [2d Cir 2015], cert denied 575 US ___, 135 S.Ct. 2335 [2015]). Given the strong public policy against liability based on testimony in judicial proceedings, the detectives here should not, at least on this record, be subjected to potential liability for their testimony at the suppression hearing alone. But because plaintiff relies on evidence independent of the suppression hearing testimony, the detectives
In addition, our decision to vitiate the grant of summary judgment to defendants does not imply that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment or should necessarily win at trial on her claims. The evidence simply discloses triable issues of fact that must be resolved by the jury rather than by the court as a matter of law (see Munoz, 18 NY2d at 11; see also Hyman v New York Cent. R.R. Co., 240 N.Y. 137, 143 [1925]). At trial, the jury remains free to infer the presence or absence of the elements of false arrest and malicious prosecution from this evidence as it sees fit, and it can reach different conclusions regarding distinct elements based on the same body of evidence.
Further, our decision does not signal that every allegation of the falsification of material evidence is a talisman shielding a plaintiff from summary judgment. It remains the law that a plaintiff's vague and conclusory assertions that the police fabricated evidence are insufficient to enable false arrest and malicious prosecution claims to survive a summary judgment motion (see Phillips v City of Syracuse, 84 A.D.2d 957, 957 [4th Dept 1981], affd 57 N.Y.2d 996 [1982]). But, where, as here, the plaintiff provides detailed sworn testimony about the police's creation and dissemination of critical fabricated evidence and the remaining proof does not eliminate all questions as to probable cause, the defendant officers cannot win summary judgment.
Lastly, as defendants do not dispute, Supreme Court erroneously dismissed plaintiff's claims against Detective Corey on the ground that she failed to timely request a default judgment against Corey based on his failure to answer in these actions.
The evidence in this case raises triable issues of fact regarding plaintiff's common-law false arrest and malicious prosecution causes of action against only Detectives Corey, Santiago, Guerra and Hendricks, as well as the governmental defendants, thereby enabling her to proceed to trial on those claims. Likewise, the record reveals the existence of triable issues of fact on plaintiff's federal civil rights claims against the aforementioned detectives. Thus, defendants' motion for summary judgment on those claims should have been denied. However, since the record is devoid of proof that an official City policy resulted in the allegedly wrongful arrest and prosecution of plaintiff, the courts below properly granted summary judgment to the governmental defendants on plaintiff's claims under 42 USC § 1983. Finally, beyond the dismissal of plaintiff's 42 USC § 1983 claims against the City on Monell grounds, it is undisputed that the lower courts properly dismissed plaintiff's other claims in the first action, and hence the Appellate Division's affirmance of Supreme Court's August 10, 2012 order should not be disturbed. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, in accordance with this opinion, and as so modified, affirmed.
Order modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.
